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ADVERTISEMENTS FOR CONTRACEPTIVES AS
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE
BROADCAST MEDIA
Since 1935, the Federal Communications Commission has prohibited the advertise-
ment of contraceptives on radio and television. Traditionally, the banning of such
purportedly "distasteful" advertising presented no consitutional ditculy. The
emerging "commercial speech doctrine, "however, mayprovidefirst amendment pro-
tection to such advertising, as it has to otherforms of commercialpersuasio This
Note analyzes the issue of contraceptive advertising under the first amendment by
discussing traditionalfirst amendment theory, the evolving commercial speech doc-
trine, and the special problems presented by the pervasiveness of electronic broad-
casting and widespread government regulation of broadcasting. After noting the
interplay of these doctrines, the Note concludes that the advertisement of contracep-
tives cannot be constitutionally bannedfrom the public airwaves.
INTRODUCTION
ADVERTISING of contraceptives has been banned from thebroadcast media since 1935 when the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) labeled one such advertisement distasteful.'
Since 1935, there has been significant development in the area of
constitutionally protected speech, a development that affects all
commercial advertising. Such commercial expression is now
granted some first amendment protection under the commercial
speech doctrine.2
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggre-
gate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable .... And if it
is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated
or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public deci-
1. In re Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 76 (1935).
2. See notes 27-70 infra and accompanying text.
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sionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow
of information does not serve that goal.3
The constitutional protection given advertising is less than the full
protection given to other forms of speech; it is a partial protection
based on a balancing of the state's interests against the individ-
ual's interest.'
Additionally, advertising in the electronic media5 is treated
differently from advertising in print. Regulation has been more
tolerable in the broadcast sector.6 At the inception of broadcast-
ing, the government intervened to control signal interference, and
has remained in the area of broadcast regulation without public
complaint.' Radio and television offer special problems:
[R]adio and television are probably the most influential media
of communication in our society today. They present, on a se-
lective basis, as all communications do, not only information
but ideas, attitudes, impressions and fantasies. They pervade
the home, the automobile and many public places. Secondly,
radio and television are by unanimous agreement, a "waste-
land." The economic, political and social factors that make
them so are sufficiently entrenched to discourage expectation of
change on the initiative of the industry itself. Thirdly,
[G]overnment movement in radio and television has always,
and necessarily been extensive.'
The problem is whether government regulation abridges free-
dom of expression in the area of broadcasting. This Note dis-
cusses the constitutionality of banning contraceptive advertising
from the broadcast media, and analyzes this restriction within the
context of the first amendment. The Note first presents a general
synopsis of the first amendment tests used to judge the constitu-
tionality of speech restrictions.9 This Note then examines two rel-
evant streams of constitutional analysis: the cases and principles
involving the status of product advertising under the first amend-
ment, 10 and the cases dealing with the constitutional limitations
on the broadcast media." The Note concludes that the constitu-
3. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976) (citations omitted).
4. See notes 78-106 infra and accompanying text.
5. "Electronic media" and "broadcast media" are terms used interchangeably by the
courts and in this Note.
6. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 22 (1976).
7. Id.
8. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 653-54 (1970).
9. See notes 12-50 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 52-57 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 109-49 infra and accompanying text.
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tionality of banning contraceptive advertising from the broadcast-
ing media is doubtful.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS
Advertising, as speech, is protected by the first amendment
when the constitutionality of its regulation is in question. "As a
general rule, any attempt by government to suppress speech or
regulate its content is subject to the 'strict scrutiny' test: govern-
ment must show a compelling state interest in order to overcome
the presumption that a regulation is unconstitutional."' 2 Certain
types of speech, however, are not afforded full first amendment
protection.' 3 The regulations affecting the free flow of such less
protected speech must satisfy only a "reasonable basis" test.'
Thus, there are two categories of government restraint and two
methods of analysis for determining the extent of first amendment
protection.
A. Communicative Impact- Content Regulation
The first category of regulation is that aimed at the suppres-
sion or regulation of the content, or "communicative impact," of
speech. Unconstitutional restraint of speech occurs if the regula-
tory action, on its face, seeks to suppress specific information or
ideas,' 5 or if the regulation, though neutral on its face, is moti-
vated by an intent to single out constitutionally protected speech
for control. 16
Regulations directed at controlling the communicative impact
of speech are unconstitutional because they contravene the princi-
ple that government may not prescribe the content of individual
expression. 7 Ordinarily, "government has no power to restrict
12. Comment, The New Commercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcast Advertising, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 394 (1979). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1976)
(disclosure requirements of federal campaign regulations upheld as essential to intelligent
use of the right of the franchise).
13. See note 20 infra.
14. Id.
15. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 584-85 (1978). See, e.g., Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (statute directed at punishing the mere advocacy of
criminal syndicalism held unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments).
16. L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 585. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968) (a teacher could not be dismissed from public employment for writing a
letter to a newspaper, absent proof of knowingly or recklessly written false statements,
except upon a showing that the expression interfered with the teacher's performance of
classroom duties or with the operation of the school).
17. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 581.
[Vol. 31:336
ADVERTISEMENTS FOR CONTRA4CEPTIVES
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content."'" To establish that particular expressive activities may
be legitimately regulated, it must be shown either that the regula-
tion controlling the communicative impact is necessary to further
a compelling state interest, 9 or that the expression falls within an
established exception to presumed constitutionality. 20 The
Supreme Court requires an especially close nexus between the
means and the ends of the regulation for it to be upheld as consti-
tutionally permissible. The means used must be narrowly drawn
regulations, and the ends must be permissible government objec-
tives.2' Moreover, if the feared harm could be averted by a fur-
ther exchange of ideas, the regulation is unnecessary and will be
struck down as an unconstitutional restriction of speech.22
Cohen v. California23 exemplifies an impermissible regulation
of content,24 and the manner in which the Supreme Court deals
with such restrictions. Cohen was convicted for violating section
415 of the California Penal Code, which prohibited "maliciously
and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
or person. . . by. . . offensive conduct."25 Cohen's alleged "of-
fensive conduct" was wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft" while he was in a hallway of the Los Angeles court-
house.26
Analyzing the constitutionality of his conviction, the Court ex-
amined the California court's basis for convicting Cohen. The
state court had defined "offensive conduct" under the statute to
include "behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts
18. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
19. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed at notes
61-68 infra and accompanying text.
20. The categories that are traditionally unprotected because they are not an essential
part of any exposition of ideas are illustrated by the following cases: Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscen-
ity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
21. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 602.
22. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Con-
stitutional freedom of expression is intended to remove governmental restraint from public
discussion, and to let each individual decide what will be heard. The purpose of this free-
dom is to produce a more capable citizenry and a "more perfect polity." Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also note 72 infra and accompanying text.
23. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
24. Id. at 18, 26.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1973).
26. 403 U.S. at 25-26.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of violence or to in turn disturb the peace."27 According to the
California court, the public display of the four-letter expletive sat-
isfied this statutory requirement.28 The Supreme Court pointed
out that Cohen's conviction was based on the words which he dis-
played on his jacket. His conduct, though "offensive," was a com-
munication. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that Cohen's
conviction rested solely on speech and not merely upon conduct
which, although intended to be expressive, did not convey a
message.29 If the Court had found that Cohen's conviction had
been premised on the latter basis, his conduct could have been
constitutionally regulated because it would not have restricted his
ability to express himself. The Court concluded that the State
lacked power to punish Cohen for the underlying content of the
message absent proof of intent to incite disobedience to or disrup-
tion of the draft.3"
The Court also dismissed any possible arguments that the
words on Cohen's jacket were traditionally unprotected forms of
speech, or that the State's action was justified because it served a
compelling state purpose.3' The applicable unprotected categories
of obscenity and fighting words did not fit Cohen's statement. The
expression was neither erotic, nor was it likely to "conjure up
psychic stimulation" to justify the label of obscene.32 The expres-
sion on the jacket was not a personally abusive epithet directed at
anybody and thus, could not be labelled fighting words. 33 Califor-
nia therefore could not regulate the content of speech by claiming
that Cohen's statement fell within an unprotected category.
Since the State of California did not present a compelling rea-
son for regulating the content of Cohen's speech, and since no one
was violently aroused by his statement, the Court held that the
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. In defining "offensive conduct" to include Cohen's public display of the four-
letter expletive, the California court did not need to analyze the freedom of speech doc-
trine. Cohen, however, had consistently asserted that his constitutional right to free speech
was being infringed upon, thereby providing the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to review
his state court conviction.
29. Id. at 19. The Court noted:
Appellant's conviction, then, rests squarely upon his exercise of the "freedom
of speech" protected from arbitrary governmental interference by the Constitu-
tion and can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the manner in
which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the substan-
tive message it conveys.
Id.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 20-22.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id.
[Vol. 31:336
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State could not validly use its police power to prevent Cohen from
expressing himself in the way he did.3 4 Likewise, the Court found
that Cohen's perhaps distasteful mode of expression was not
forced upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers.35 Although gov-
ernment may properly prohibit unwelcome intrusion of ideas
which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue, the
Court noted that people must often be subject to objectionable
speech outside the home unless the state can show that "substan-
tial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolera-
ble manner."36 In Cohen's case, it was observed that persons in
the courthouse could have avoided seeing the jacket merely by
averting their eyes.37 Moreover, it was noted that the conviction
could not stand, even if it were construed in consonance with the
California court's interpretation, since there was no evidence that
anyone unable to avoid Cohen's conduct objected to it.38
"[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason for its ac-
tions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourth
Amendments, make the simple display here involved of this single
four-letter expletive a criminal offense."39
Cohen, then, illustrates the Supreme Court's conviction that
the communicative impact of speech must ordinarily stand invio-
late. It shows the breadth of the category of "protected speech,"
including within its ambit vulgar epithets, and demonstrates that
only in sharply limited circumstances-when there is a compelling
state interest-may government regulate the content of protected
speech.
B. Noncommunicative Impact: Form and Manner Regulation
Government restraint of speech may occur when a regulation
is not directed at the content of speech, but regulates the form and
manner of the communication, and indirectly restricts the flow of
ideas and information.40 Abridgement results when rules limit ac-
tivities through which ideas are conveyed and thereby discourage
or chill the free flow of information. Thus, the problem is decid-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 22.
39. Id. at 26.
40. See, e-g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (restrictions on distributions of
circulars door-to-door and in the street invalid; indirect restraint on communication not
justified).
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ing when a regulation unduly constricts speech. To this end, the
Court employs a balancing test, weighing the inhibition of expres-
sion against the governmental interests sought to be furthered by
the regulation.4'
Unless the restriction inhibits speech in a public forum42 or is
shown to be substantial, the Court's scrutiny of the government's
justification for the regulation is minimal, rather than strict. Thus,
the government must show only a rational justification for its
choice of regulatory means so long as other means through which
the speaker's views may be made known, and other ways by which
the listener may receive the ideas are available.43
United States v. O'Brien,' involving the burning of draft
cards, aptly illustrates this balancing approach.45 O'Brien, by
burning his draft card, allegedly frustrated the government's inter-
est in maintaining the smooth functioning of the Selective Service
System. He was punished for the noncommunicative impact of
his act. 6 O'Brien was not treated as a case where the governmen-
tal interest in regulating conduct arose because the communica-
tion itself was thought to be harmful.47 Rather, the Court viewed
the case as involving a content-neutral regulation of speech and,
employing a relaxed standard of scrutiny, concluded that the gov-
ernmental purpose of preserving draft cards was served least re-
41. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 408 U.S. 551 (1972); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. The term "public forum" historically includes places such as public streets, side-
walks, and parks because of their role for people who lack access to more elaborate chan-
nels of communication. Government cannot regulate speech-related conduct in these
places except in narrow ways necessary to serve significant state interests. See generally,
Kalven, The Concept ofthe Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (P.
Kurland ed. 1965).
43. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (rejecting argument that there exists
a first amendment right to make political speeches at Fort Dix; government's interest in
maintaining military discipline and availability of offbase political rallies outweigh com-
municative interest).
44. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien burned his draft card before a crowd in an attempt
to influence them to adopt his antiwar stance. He was tried and convicted for violating the
1965 Amendment to the Selective Service Act which applies to anyone "who forges, alters,
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes" his draft card. 50
U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1965), Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)
(1948)). The Court found the Amendment to be constitutional on its face, and concluded
that the government can regulate the destruction and mutilation of draft cards without
infringing the individual's freedom of speech. 391 U.S. at 375, 377-78.
45. For a more detailed explanation of this sort of balancing, see Note, Attorney .4d-
vertising is Commercial Speech Protected by the First 4mendment: Bates v. State Bar, 37
MD. L. REV. 350 (1977).




strictively by the statutory provision.48
The Court upheld O'Brien's conviction because it found "a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element" that was "unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression" and that had only an "incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms. . . no greater than [was] essential to
the furtherance of that interest. '49 The O'Brien Court articulated
a four-part test by which government regulation of the noncom-
municative impact of speech is examined:
[I]f it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on . . . First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.50
Under this test, a regulation of conduct is constitutional if it has
an incidental rather than a direct impact on speech. To uphold a
direct restriction on speech, however, it is necessary to prove that
the restriction furthers a compelling state interest. 1
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS AS APPLIED TO
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech does not fit cleanly into first amendment
analysis. Although the Court has never explicitly placed commer-
cial speech within the selected categories of unprotected speech,52
it has historically treated commercial speech as having very little
first amendment value.53 Early cases did not recognize constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech, even where regulations
were directed at its communicative impact. 4 Recently, however,
48. Id. "When O'Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate,
he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his
conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted."
49. Id. at 376-77.
50. Id. at 377.
51. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). See L. TRIBE, supra note 15,
at 602-08.
52. See Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (1971) (stating that the Court
"seems to" apply the protected-unprotected approach to commercial speech). See also
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-19 (1975), where the Court states that it has never
included commercial speech in the unprotected categories that it has noted.
53. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), discussed at notes 56-60 infra
and accompanying text.
54. See, eg., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971),
aj'd sub non Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)
(mem.), discussed at notes 136-46 infra and accompanying text.
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the Court reevaluated the first amendment interests implicated in
commercial speech and found that commercial speech contains
valuable ideas and information that place it within the ambit of
first amendment protection." In its analysis of commercial
speech, the Court appears to use elements of both streams of first
amendment analysis - communicative impact and noncommuni-
cative impact - while emphasizing the rights of individuals to
receive the information.
Valentine v. Chrestensen56 was the first case to state the com-
mercial speech doctrine. There the Supreme Court refused to en-
join the enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited the
distribution of commercial advertising in the streets. The leaflet
distributed by the respondent contained two statements: on one
side he advertised an exhibit of a submarine, entry to which re-
quired the payment of a fee; on the other, he printed a protest
against the city for refusing him wharf facilities for the exhibi-
tion. 7 The Court held that the first amendment imposed no re-
straint on government with respect to the regulation of
commercial advertising,5" and that the defendant's ancillary pro-
test against official conduct did not change the character of his
speech.5 9 Consequently, enforcement of the ordinance was consti-
tutional.60
The first step toward the modem theory of commercial speech
was taken in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6' where the Court
distinguished between commercial speech and editorial advertis-
ing,62 and defined commercial speech in terms of its content rather
than the speaker's purpose. 63 The New York Times ran an adver-
tisement which solicited contributions for the cause of Dr. Martin
Luther King and implied that police took unlawful action against
participants in the civil rights movement.' The Court stated that
the publication "communicated information, expressed opinion,
55. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), discussed at notes 78-95 infra and accompanying text.
56. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. at 54-55.
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
62. Id. at 266.
63. The earlier cases were decided on the "primary purpose" test which looked to the
purpose of the speech and speaker. If it was a commercial purpose, then the speech was
unprotected. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), discussed at notes
56-60 supra and accompanying text.
64. 376 U.S. at 256-59.
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recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial
support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest public interest and concern."65 Thus,
the Court looked to the advertisement's content rather than the
publisher's reason for printing it, and held that speech containing
information and opinions on matters generally concerning the
public is fully protected by the first amendment, even when it ap-
pears in the form of paid advertising.66 The advertisement was
distinguished from a "commercial" advertisement as used in Val-
entine, where opinions were appended to purely commercial ad-
vertising for the sole purpose of avoiding the ordinance. 6
7
The importance of Sullivan is that it classified one form of
commercial speech as constitutionally protected. The Court ex-
amined the content of the advertisement, and found that it con-
veyed more than a commercial purpose; because the
advertisement contained information of the "highest public inter-
est and concern," it was constitutionally protected. 6 Thus, a new
standard was introduced: the content of commercial speech
would be scrutinized for publicly useful information, which could
bring it within the protection of the first amendment.
The next significant case on the question of commercial speech
continued using content analysis. The advertisements in Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations69
were want ads, separated into columns by sex, thereby violating a
Pittsburgh ordinance prohibiting the practice of employment dis-
crimination. The Court labelled such advertisements "classic ex-
amples" of commercial speech because they did no more than
propose a commercial transaction.7 0 This content-based analysis
then revealed that the sex-separated advertisements did not fall
under the protection of the first amendment, for there is a compel-
ling state interest in prohibiting advertisements which promote
65. Id. at 266.
66. Id. See also Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1089.
67. 376 U.S. at 266.
68. Id.
69. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
70. Id. at 385.
None [of the want ads] expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social
policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor
does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commission's enforcement prac-
tices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible employment. The advertise-
ments are thus classic examples of commercial speech.
1981]
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sex-based discrimination in employment.7"
After Pittsburgh Press, the Court continued to hold that speech
was not entitled to first amendment protection merely because it
took the form of paid commercial advertisement. The Court,
however, departed from its strict content-based analysis and es-
tablished more flexible standards for deciding when to protect
commercial speech. These standards have been used in cases
where the speech is initially found to be protected because its con-
tent is not purely "commercial" advertising.
The first indication of this new approach appeared in Bigelow
v. Virginia,72 where the advertisement in question provided infor-
mation regarding the availability of abortions in New York.
Under Virginia law, publishing such advertising constituted a
misdemeanor, and the publisher, Bigelow, challenged his convic-
tion under the statute.73 The Court began its analysis by noting
that advertising may be subject to reasonable regulation serving
legitimate public interest-an observation which apparently re-
jected strict scrutiny, and instead integrated the reasonable basis
test traditionally employed for regulations aimed at the indirect
impact of speech.74 One commentator has summarized this new
test:
A government regulation directly suppressing commercial
speech is valid if (1) upon a balancing of the various interests,
the state's justification prevails under close scrutiny, (2) the reg-
ulation substantially furthers a legitimate, albeit not compel-
ling, state purpose, and (3) the regulation, narrowly tailored to
accomplish its designed purpose, constitutes the least restrictive
alternative.75
Applying its new approach in Bigelow, the Court held that Vir-
ginia's asserted interest in shielding its citizens from activities in
71. The Court also considered whether the editorial judgment used by the paper in the
presentation of its advertising was distinguishable from the content of the advertisements,
and decided that the presentation was not entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at
387. Placing headings over columns of advertising, an exercise of editorial judgment, does
not necessarily strip commercial advertising of its commercial nature and bring it within
first amendment protection. Id. Since nothing in the headings differentiated them from
the want ads themselves, the entire package constituted illegal discrimination, and judged
on content, the advertisements were not protected by the first amendment. Pittsburgh Press
thus presents an example of a regulation which, though directed at the communicative
impact of speech, is nevertheless allowable because the regulation furthered a compelling
state interest-avoiding employment discrimination.
72. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
73. VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1960), construedin 421 U.S. at 814-15.
74. See notes 40-50 supra and accompanying text.
75. Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amend-
ment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 126 (1979).
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other states did not outweigh the individuars interest in access to
useful information brought into the "marketplace of ideas; 7 6
thus, the Virginia statute violated the first amendment.77
Although Bigelow was the first intimation of the Court's new
commercial speech doctrine, its decision one year later in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 78 stands as the most important of the commercial speech
cases. In Virginia Pharmacy, the consumers asserted that the first
amendment entitled them to any information which pharmacists
wanted to communicate to them. Thus, they challenged a Vir-
ginia statute79 prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prices of
prescription drugs. Holding that the content of commercial
speech is not entirely outside the first amendment,80 the Court
struck down the statute for failing to serve the state's interest in
maintaining the professionalism of pharmacists; absent such a
compelling state interest, the content of the speech could not be
regulated.8'
Although the Court gave first amendment protection to truth-
ful commercial advertisements, it also reaffirmed the state's au-
thority to regulate time, place, and manner of speech.82 The state,
however, would have to show that, regardless of the content of the
76. The "marketplace of ideas" theory of first amendment protection, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, has had a substantial impact upon the area of commercial speech.
The theory holds that discovery of truth justifies and defines the scope of protection given
to speech. Using this theory, the rationale behind the first amendment is to promote ascer-
tainment of truth and exposure of falseness. For a critical examination of this concept, see
Baker, Scope of the First ,4mendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978).
77. 421 U.S. at 829.
78. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1978) (provision prohibiting advertisements of
prices repealed in 1980, see VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Supp. 7A 1980)).
80. 425 U.S. at 761-62. "If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First
Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject
* Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection." Id.
81. Id. at 769. Virginia defined its interest to include (1) protecting expertise of phar-
macists to keep them from becoming mere retailers; (2) supporting the relationship be-
tween each pharmacist and his or her customers so that pharmacists could continue to
monitor drug consumption of regular customers; and (3) protecting the ability of pharma-
cists to supply professional services which, in the advent of price competition, would be
drastically reduced in order to cut costs. Id. at 766-68.
82. Time, place, and manner restrictions were defined in public forum cases where
speakers sought to use public facilities which the government must allocate as the public's
trustee. See, eg., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (bans on door-to-door and
street distribution of circulars invalidated where governmental purposes could be achieved
by less restrictive means). The first amendment requires that time, place, and manner regu-
lation affecting protected expression be imposed without reference to the content of the
speech, except in the limited context of "captive audiences." Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
1981]
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speech, the regulations both serve a significant government inter-
est and leave open other channels of communication.13 Thus, the
Virginia Pharmacy Court did not hold that the state could never
regulate truthful commercial advertisements."4
In refusing to analyze commercial speech strictly on the basis
of its content, as it does with other types of speech, 5 the Court
said that "a different degree of protection is necessary to insure
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired."8 6 The Court reasoned that commercial speech may
be more "durable" than other types of speech because it is an im-
portant factor in making profits, and thus, it is less likely to be
chilled by regulation. 7 Furthermore, "the truth of commercial
speech . . . may be more easily verifiable by its dissemination
than . . . news reporting . . ., in that ordinarily the advertiser
seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or serv-
ice that he himself provides and presumably knows more about
than anyone else." 88 Therefore, the Court concluded, there is not
so great a need to give commercial speech the absolute, content-
based protection given other types of speech.
Ultimately, the difference in "degree of protection" recognized
in Virginia Pharmacy means that after initial examination as to
content, regulations will be subjected to less severe scrutiny in the
subsequent analysis of the state's justification-a scrutiny similar
to that given to regulations affecting noncommunicative impact.8 9
The Court's analysis in Virginia Pharmacy thus continues the
"mixed scrutiny" analysis begun in Bigelow: refusing to grant full
protection based solely on content, but once content is found to be
protected, scrutinizing the regulations according to the less strict
noncommunicative standard.9" Herein lies the difference between
U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (because labor picketing had previously been allowed, ordinance prohib-
iting picketing near school invalidly applied on basis of content).
83. Rotunda, supra note 66, at 1097.
84. 425 U.S. at 770-71.
85. See notes 14-22 supra and accompanying text.
86. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See notes 40-51 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Court summarized its approach this way:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-




commercial speech and other forms of speech. Under the second
part of the analysis, regulations may still be found constitutional
even though the content of commercial speech enjoys some first
amendment protection.
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court granted first amendment pro-
tection partly because of the consumer's interest in the free flow of
information. 91 After recognizing this interest, the Court inquired
into whether the legislature had acted reasonably in passing the
statute, and concluded that the statute did substantial harm to the
consumer.92 The Court suggested that before enacting such pater-
nalistic regulations, the legislature must consider the gravity of
this harm, the capability of each citizen to bear the burdens cre-
ated, the number of people harmed and an alternative which the
first amendment demands:
That alternative is to assume that this information is not in it-
self harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them .... But the choice among these alternative ap-
proaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assem-
bly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us. Vir-
ginia is free to require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacists. . . . But it may not do so by keeping
the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that com-
peting pharmacists are offering.93
The Court also left the state the power to regulate advertisements
in the broadcast media,94 indicating that it might not treat broad-
cast advertising in the same manner as print advertising. 95
After Virginia Pharmacy, the Court reaffirmed the rule that
commercial speech which serves some individual and societal in-
terests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking will
probably be entitled to some constitutional protection.96 Subse-
quently, however, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,97 the
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (1980).
91. 425 U.S. at 765.
92. Id. at 763.
93. Id. at 770.
94. Id. at 773.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that truthful advertising
of "routine legal services" is protected against blanket prohibition by a state, but reserving
the question of permissible scope of regulation of "in-person solicitation of clients").
97. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Court limited the definition of protected commercial speech, while
maintaining its theory of commercial speech analysis as developed
in Virginia Pharmacy.
In Ohralik, the Ohio State Bar Association brought discipli-
nary action against an attorney who solicited personal injury busi-
ness from two eighteen-year-olds who had been hospitalized as a
result of a car accident.98 The action was heard by the Discipli-
nary Board of the Ohio Supreme Court, and, subsequently, the
Ohio court adopted the Board's findings that the attorney's con-
duct constituted a breach of certain Disciplinary Rules. 99
The United States Supreme Court reiterated that the State
does not lose the power to regulate commercial activity deemed
harmful to the public simply because speech is a component of
that activity." ° The Court found "a legitimate and indeed 'com-
pelling' ",10 state interest in Ohralik: because lawyers have spe-
cial duties as "trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to
the court in search of a just solution to disputes,"' 2 the state may
prevent attorneys from engaging in "those aspects of solicitation
that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching,
and other forms of 'vexatious conduct.' "103 The in-person solici-
tation did not serve "the individual and societal interest, . . . in
facilitating 'informed and reliable decisionmaking,"'' and
therefore it did not qualify for the protection given in Virginia
Pharmacy to informative commercial speech.
Ohralik exemplifies the Court's present first amendment the-
ory of commercial speech.'05 Content of speech, in this case in-
person client solicitation, though protected by the first amend-
ment, 106 is not guaranteed first amendment protection on that ba-
sis. Rather, it is subject to a second analysis and a standard of
less-than-strict scrutiny. If a court finds a "legitimate," though not
necessarily a compelling, state interest in regulating commercial
speech, the regulation will be upheld even where it is directed at
the content of speech.' 7
98. Id. at 449-50.
99. Id. at 452-53.
100. Id. at 456.
101. Id. at 462.
102. Id. at 460.
103. Id. at 462.
104. Id. at 458.
105. See Comment, supra note 12, at 397-99.
106. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
107. 436 U.S. at 455-57.
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In sum, the Court has embraced a hybrid theory of first
amendment protection in the area of commercial speech. The
government may regulate the content of the message where there
is a rational basis for doing so. This treatment may allow for reg-
ulations that would be impermissible if directed at other forms of
speech. However, where listeners' rights to receive information
are paramount, all viewpoints must be accorded a reasonable op-
portunity to be heard. Thus, when commercial speech is pro-
tected, it is because of its value to both consumers and society, and
government is obliged to allow reasonable means for its commu-
nication.
III. BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although commercial advertising has been held to be constitu-
tionally protected, there are different considerations in the context
of the broadcast media.'08 Thus while the commercial speech
doctrine protects the advertisement of contraceptives outside the
broadcast media,0 9 such advertising has been specifically ex-
cluded from broadcasts. 10 The constitutionality of this ban must
be analyzed in light of more recent developments in the area of
broadcasting.
Congress created the FCC in 1934,"' and its jurisdiction em-
braces all "wire communications" including both radio and televi-
sion broadcasts." 2 Congress empowered the FCC to regulate
broadcasting "as public convenience, interest, or necessity re-
quires," ' thereby giving the FCC a broad mandate to regulate
many facets of the broadcast industry, including advertising."14
Broadcast regulation arose from the early need to monitor the
distribution of the available broadcast frequencies so as to prevent
interference among them. From this narrow rationale, however, a
doctrine developed whereby those who were permitted to use the
public airwaves were selected on the basis of criteria and sub-
108. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. at 773; see generally Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising:
The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 205, 233-35, 251-53 (1976).
109. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See note 157 infra and ac-
companying text.
110. See In re Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 76 (1935) (FCC found con-
traceptive advertising on the radio to be "unconscionable").
111. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
112. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
113. Id. § 303.
114. Id. § 303(g), (i), (r). See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) discussed at notes 115-28 infra and accompanying text.
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jected to controls that would be unacceptable under the first
amendment if applied to the print media.
A. Development of FCC Regulatory Power
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,II5 NBC sued to
enjoin FCC enforcement of regulations concerning "chain broad-
casting," or the simultaneous broadcasting of an identical pro-
gram by two or more affiliated stations." 6 At issue was whether
Congress had authorized the FCC to exercise the power asserted
by the chain broadcasting regulations, and if it had, whether the
Constitution prohibited such delegation of legislative authority.
In support of the regulations, it was argued that the duties of the
FCC include both ensuring that the public receives the benefits of
broadcast facilities, and eliminating any practices adversely affect-
ing the ability of the licensee stations to operate in the public in-
terest.1 7
The importance of the NBC decision lies in Justice Frank-
furter's statement of the constitutionality of the comprehensive
regulatory powers granted by Congress to the FCC."8 Congress
did not authorize the FCC to choose among license applicants on
the basis of broadcast content," 9 but rather gave the Commission
a fixed standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity."'
' 2 0
The Court examined the regulations and, finding them to be
within the statutory criterion of public interest, held that the de-
nial of licenses under this standard did not constitute a denial of
free speech. 2 ' Therefore, the FCC was within its delegated au-
thority.
In NBC the Court applied a traditional first amendment anal-
ysis to the regulations. Finding that content was not the object of
the regulation, the Court applied the noncommunicative impact
test with its lower standard of scrutiny. The Court recognized that
because the licensing agency necessarily excluded some speakers
from the broadcast media, its licensing standard necessarily had
some impact on speech. Nevertheless, the Court found a legiti-
115. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
116. Id. at 193 (construing 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1976)).
117. Id. at 196-98 (discussing the 1941 Report of the FCC on chain broadcasting).
118. Id. at 216-17.
119. "But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants
upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious
basis." Id. at 226.
120. Id. at 227.
121. Id. at 226-27.
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mate state interest, ensuring a wider program selection to the gen-
eral public, which was sufficient to uphold the regulations.
22
Thus, the Court supported the FCC's determination that those
who engaged in specified network practices, such as chain broad-
casting, were acting contrary to the public interest, convenience,
or necessity.23
Even though it held that the FCC licensing standard, and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, were constitutional, the
Court also articulated a second reason for strict regulation of the
broadcast media: the scarcity rationale. The Court reasoned that
the limited facilities of radio, unlike other modes of expression,
were not available to everyone. Thus, by definition, freedom of
speech was denied to many who desired media access.124 The
Court found this denial to be radio's "unique characteristic, and
that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to gov-
ernmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who
wish to use it must be denied."'' 25
The Court's scarcity rationale is premised on the limited
number of frequencies available for use by those who wish to
broadcast - not everyone can physically be accommodated. The
government must bring order into the arena of broadcasting by
regulating access to these limited facilities. 26 The NBC Court ac-
knowledged this premise,'27 and opined that such regulation was
not limited to the technical aspects of broadcasting, but extended
to the composition of the broadcast traffic itself.'28
This scarcity rationale is still used to justify extensive regula-
tion of the broadcast media; for example it has been used to regu-
late the conduct of broadcasters. 2 9 It has been held that the right
122. Id. at 227.
123. Id. at 224-26.
124. Id. at 226.
125. Id.
126. One author has stated that this argument is based on two fallacies. First, eco-
nomic, not technical, restrictions limit the saturation of the radio broadcast spectrum. Sec-
ond, because there are more radio and television outlets than there are newspapers, the
former offer more opportunities for expression. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amend-
ment: Observations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv.
67, 88 (1968).
127. 319 U.S. at 213.
128. Id. at 215-16.
129. In one case, the author of a book was personally attacked in a radio broadcast,
and the radio station refused to grant him reply time. The Court, relying on the scarcity
rationale, held that broadcasters must grant reply time because there is an affirmative obli-
gation on the broadcaster to see that both sides of issues are presented. Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-79 (1969). As used in this Note, the term
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of free speech for broadcasters does not embrace the right to block
out the free speech of others, 130 for it is the right of the viewers or
listeners which is paramount. It seems that the public has a right
to have the media function consistently with the ends and pur-
poses of the first amendment. 13  Due to the scarcity of frequen-
cies'32 and public ownership of the airwaves, the government can
affirmatively promote diversity by regulating access in the public
interest. 133 The broadcaster as an individual has only the first
amendment rights of a "proxy or fiduciary," 134 with an obligation
"to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community"'' 35 so as to alleviate the problems of scarcity.
B. Regulation of Advertising in the Broadcast Media
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,136 a challenge to the
FCC's ban on cigarette advertisements from the electronic com-
munications media, provides a convenient point of departure for
analysis of advertising on the public airwaves. In Capital, the
court upheld the ban, reasoning that product advertising was less
vigorously protected by the first amendment than other speech. 37
The court also cited NBC for its view that the uniqueness of the
electronic media makes it "especially subject to regulation in the
public interest."'' 31
According to the court, the ban did not deprive Capital of any
"broadcaster" means those who manage broadcasting facilities and are responsible for
what is seen or heard by the public.
130. Id. at 387. The Court analogized the ability of the government to limit the use of
broadcasting equipment to its ability to limit the use of sound amplifying equipment which
drowns out civilized private speech. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding
a municipal ordinance forbidding the use of sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous
noises").
131. 395 U.S. at 390. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to counte-
nance monopolization of that market, whether it be by government itself or a private
licensee." Id.
132. One commentator has noted that scarcity should not be measured by the number
of stations that are allowed to broadcast, but by the number of individuals or groups who
wish to use the facilities, or would use them if they were more readily available. This
conception of scarcity would be labelled scarcity of opportunity, not scarcity of frequencies.
T. EMERSON, supra note 8, at 662.
133. 395 U.S. at 388-90.
134. Id. at 389.
135. Id.
136. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'dsub nom Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (mem.).
137. Id. at 584. This argument has been considerably weakened by more recent com-
mercial speech cases. See notes 72-107 supra and accompanying text.
138. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
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first amendment rights; the network could still air its views on cig-
arettes. The network lost only the opportunity to collect revenue
from cigarette advertising. 39 Thus, the ban had only a noncom-
municative impact on the right of free speech and, accordingly,
required only a rational basis to meet the test of constitutional-
ity. 1
40
The court explained that there is a rational basis for the con-
gressional ban on cigarette advertisements over broadcast facili-
ties, even though such advertisements are allowed in print.'41
First, broadcast advertisements are more persuasive, and the audi-
ence for them consists largely of young people. 42 The govern-
ment has a reasonable interest in regulating advertising to which
young people are exposed.'43 Second, since the airwaves are pub-
licly owned, radio and television may be rationally distinguished
from other, privately owned, media. 44 Broadcast facilities must
therefore operate in the public interest. The court implied that the
government must guard the public interest by promulgating regu-
lations concerning broadcast advertising: 145 "Thus, Congress had
information quite sufficient to believe that a proscription covering
only the electronic media would be an appropriate response to the
problem of cigarette advertising."'4 6 Congress, therefore, could
prohibit such advertisements in the public interest.
The public interest, however, may dictate not regulating ad-
vertising. Justice White, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,4 7
maintained that the public's right to know extended first amend-
ment protection to the broadcast industry: "It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.14 8
This statement implies that broadcast messages which provide in-
formation needed by the public to make knowledgeable decisions
should not be restricted. This concept, however, does not under-
cut the rationale for the Capital decision - cigarette advertise-
139. Id.
140. Id. at 585.
141. 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (1971).
142. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising---1969 Hearings on H.R 643, 1237, 3055 &
6543 Before the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
456-57 (1969) (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, chairman of the FTC).
143. See also Note, supra note 108, at 247.
144. 333 F. Supp. at 586. See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951).
145. See H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1963).
146. 333 F. Supp. at 586.
147. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
148. Id. at 390.
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ments, as they were then aired, contained no information useful to
the public in making consumer decisions, 14 9 and the state interest
in reducing the hazardous effects of smoking could prevail in the
balance. Still, in other areas, such as contraceptives, the public's
right to information may be more substantial.
C. Contraceptive Advertising as Commercial Speech in the
Broadcast Media
Certain types of product advertisements do not appear in the
broadcast media. The National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB), a self-regulating body, promulgates restrictions on some
advertising subjects. Advertising standards are set forth in both its
Television Code 5 ° and its Radio Code.' 5' Unlike the ban on
hard liquor advertising, the Codes do not specifically ban contra-
ceptive advertising.'52 Contraceptive advertising is probably clas-
sified under the personal products subsection which requires that
advertisements for personal products conform to a general stan-
dard of good taste.' 53
The FCC has traditionally concerned itself with excessive ad-
vertising, ruling infrequently on the advertising of particular
products; 54 in the case of liquor advertising for example, the FCC
has confined itself to approval of the NAB's self-regulatory stan-
dards. 155 The FCC, however, has ruled on the subject of contra-
ceptive advertising.
In re Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co. 156 determined that a ra-
dio advertisement for contraceptives was both offensive and con-
149. In 1969, the Public Health Smoking Act banned cigarette advertisements in the
electronic media, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). Notably, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare and the Federal Trade Commission had recommended that consumer infor-
mation, such as tar and nicotine content, be included in all cigarette advertisements. S.
REP. No. 91-556, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1969), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2652, 2655-57.
150. NAB, The Television Code 4-15 (20th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Television
Code].
151. NAB, The Radio Code 13-18 (21st ed. 1978). All references are to the Television
Code because the advertising regulations are substantially identical.
152. Television Code, supra note 150, § IX, 1 7.
153. "Because all products of a personal nature create special problems, acceptability
of such products should be determined with special emphasis on ethics and the canons of
good taste. Such advertising of personal products as is accepted must be presented in a
restrained and obviously inoffensive manner." Id. § IX, I 11.
154. Robinson, supra note 117, at 109.
155. See Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005,
1155 (1967).
156. 2 F.C.C. 76 (1935).
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trary to the public interest. The FCC has neither overruled this
decision nor deferred to regulations from the NAB.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Population Services
International,'57 however, may undercut the Knickerbocker deci-
sion. Carey is the sole commercial speech case in which the
Supreme Court directly addressed the contraceptive advertising
controversy. Population Planning Associates, Inc. (PPA), one of
the appellees with Population Services International, is a North
Carolina mail order firm which sold nonprescription contracep-
tives to customers of any age. The firm advertised in New York,
which had a law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to persons
under the age of sixteen.':" The statute permitted only licensed
pharmacists to sell or distribute contraceptives, but forbade them
from advertising or displaying these products in any manner.159
Addressing this prohibition of contraceptive advertising, the
Court invoked Virginia Pharmacy, which, it was maintained, pre-
vents states from completely suppressing the dissemination of
truthful information regarding a lawful activity "even when that
information could be categorized as 'commercial speech.' "160 Ac-
cording to the Court, "the prohibition of any advertisement or dis-
play of contraceptives that seeks to suppress completely any
information about the availability and price of contraceptives can-
not be justified ..... ,,..
The Court's analysis of the state's interests'62 indicates that it
applied the traditional first amendment "strict scrutiny" standard
to the state's ban on contraceptive advertising. 63 The state's argu-
ments were that the advertisements were offensive, that such ad-
vertisements would incite illicit behavior in minors, and that such
advertisements would lead the state's minors to believe that the
state endorsed their sexual activity.'" The Court held these argu-
157. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
158. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972). The Court held that the statute's
restrictions on sales to minors violated constitutionally protected rights of decisionmaking
in matters of childbearing because the state did not demonstrate a compelling interest. 431
U.S. at 690-91.
159. 431 U.S. at 690-91.
160. Id. at 700.
161. Id. at 679.
162. The Court referred to the "substantial individual and societal interests" in the
suppressed information. Id. at 700-01.
163. Justice Brennan noted: "Appellants contend that advertisements of contraceptive
products would be offensive and embarassing to those exposed to them. . . Ibjut these are
classically not justifications validating the suppression of expression protected by the First
Amendment." 431 U.S. at 701. See also Comment, supra note 12, at 389-90.
164. 431 U.S. at 707.
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ments failed to justify the total suppression of contraceptive ad-
vertising:165 "[Wihere obscenity is not involved, [the Court has]
consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offen-
sive to some does not justify its suppression." 166 Furthermore,
none of the advertisements were "directed to inciting or producingimminent lawless action," nor were they "likely to incite or pro-
duce such action;"' 67 the advertisements "merely state the availa-
bility of products and services that are not only entirely legal, but
constitutionally protected."'' 68 Since New York did not demon-
strate a compelling state interest for regulating the advertising of
contraceptives, the Court held the New York statute unconstitu-
tional. 169
Virginia Pharmacy seems still to be the most important deci-
sion concerning commercial speech even though it was decided
before Carey, since it gave the most expansive definition of the
term and since the Court noted it was not holding that commercial
speech can never be regulated in any way.' 71 It is this latter pro-
nouncement that has been applied in later cases.171 The advertis-
ing in Carey fits into the category of commercial speech serving
some societal interest in informed decisionmaking, the category
held to be constitutionally protected in Virginia Pharmacy. 72 The
information suppressed by the New York statute was related to
activity in which, "at least in some respects, the State could not
interfere,"'' 73 - the "fundamental rights" of privacy 74 and con-
165. Id. at 701-02. On the question of advertising restrictions, Justice Powell, in con-
currence, noted that carefully tailored restrictions may be especially appropriate for contra-
ceptive advertisements on television and radio. "The Court does leave open the question
whether this or other state interests would justify regulation of the time, place or manner of
such commercial advertising. In my view, such carefully tailored restrictions may be espe-
cially appropriate when advertising is accomplished by means of the electronic media." Id.
at 712 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 701. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), discussed at notes 22-37
supra (refusing to classify a four-letter word on the back of a jacket in a public courthouse
as a "fighting word").
167. 431 U.S. at 701. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (reversing the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute).
168. 431 U.S. at 701.
169. Id. at 700-01.
170. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
171. See, e.g., Ohralik v. State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); see also notes 97-104
supra and accompanying text.
172. 431 U.S. at 700.
173. Id. at 701 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760).
174. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to decide
whether or not to end a pregnancy is fundamental, encompassed by the right of privacy).
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traception. 175 Carey, then, leads to the conclusion that informed
decisionmaking with regard to constitutional rights should be pro-
tected because the Court stated that the consumer's right to infor-
mation concerning marketed contraceptives must be considered in
determining whether a regulation abridges the first amendment. 176
Still, commercial speech is treated differently in the broadcast
media. There are established rationales for the special treatment
of broadcasting - and hence broadcast advertising - which must
be considered, including the scarcity of broadcast frequencies 177
and, as recently announced, the intrusiveness of the broadcast me-
dia.
It is the intrusiveness rationale which could have the greatest
impact on broadcast advertising of contraceptives, for it arose
from an allegedly "offensive" broadcast. FCC v. Pacflca Founda-
tion 171 involved the afternoon radio broadcast of a satire on pro-
fanity, including words that the public may find offensive.
Although the Court did not mention the scarcity rationale em-
ployed in NBC, it relied upon the intrusiveness rationale for the
first time: "the broadcast media have established a uniquely per-
vasive presence in the lives of all Americans;" 179 and "prior warn-
ings cannot completely protect the listener. . . from unexpected
program content."'180
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that offensive ma-
terial broadcast on the radio confronted the citizen at home
"where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of the intruder,"' 181 and the option of
turning off an offensive broadcast "does not give. . . a constitu-
tional immunity."' 82 The Court justified the regulation of broad-
casts containing profanity, a traditionally disfavored form of
speech,183 on two grounds: first, the broadcast media are readily
175. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (invalidating a regulation
making contraceptives less available to unmarried than to married couples, stating that if
"the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
176. 431 U.S. at 700-01. See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 86-100 supra and accompanying text.
178. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
179. Id. at 748.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 749. Justice Stevens drew an analogy: "To say that one may avoid further
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow." Id. at 748-49.
183. Id.
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accessible to children, and the state has an interest in the well-
being of its youth; second, there is a need to support the "parents'
claim to authority over their own household."'' 8 4
Carey, however, may dictate a different result for contracep-
tive advertising. That case established that the right to receive in-
formation concerning contraceptives is constitutionally protected.
Moreover, the Court's invalidation of the statute, which prohib-
ited the sale of contraceptives to persons under sixteen may imply
that age cannot be a legitimate barrier to receiving commercial
information regarding contraceptives. Hence, parents cannot con-
trol access to contraceptives through state regulations requiring
parental consent for their distribution, 85 and, arguably, the state's
interest in the well-being of its youth does not outweigh the indi-
vidual's right to use contraceptives. Therefore, the two major jus-
tifications for the intrusiveness doctrine, which supported Pacfica
are much weaker under Carey's implications. Intrusiveness as a
justification for prohibiting commercial advertising of contracep-
tives in the broadcast media should not survive a constitutional
challenge.
The Court in Carey ruled that the content of contraceptive ad-
vertising may not be regulated, 186 unless the state demonstrates a
compelling state interest for doing so.87 Still, the commercial
speech cases have held that once speech has been cleared on con-
tent, the courts should proceed to scrutinize the regulation with a
less strict standard. 8 Similarly, in the broadcast area, the courts
use the congressionally given standard of regulation, and subject
FCC regulations to a rational basis test.' 89 Thus, the less strict
184. Id. at 747.
185. In Carey, a plurality of justices felt that since a state can not require parental
consent for minors choosing to abort, "the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the
distribution of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed." 431 U.S. at 694.
186. Id. at 700-01. The FCC, however, can regulate the form of advertising because of
its noncommunicative impact. For example, the short length of advertisements and the
need to compete with other commercials for consumer attention has led advertisers to de-
sign advertisements to make an immediate impact. Advertisers use techniques such as loud
music, which may be offensive to some individuals. Comment, supra note 7, at 439. The
FCC is already empowered to regulate offensive advertising techniques, using the standard
of public convenience, interest, and necessity. See notes 79-100 supra and accompanying
text. The FCC may regulate these aspects of advertising because they have a noncom-
municative impact on speech.
187. 431 U.S. at 686.
188. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
189. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (1971), aI'dsub nom
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (mem.), discussed
at text accompanying notes 136-46 supra.
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standard is used for both commercial speech and broadcasting.
In a case involving contraceptive advertising, the FCC would
have to show at least a reasonable state interest to justify prohibit-
ing the broadcast. This showing, however, is made difficult by Ca-
rey because the most frequently asserted state interests were
dismissed as neither reasonable nor compelling.' 90 One interest
that might be asserted for the prohibition of broadcast contracep-
tive advertisements is the need to protect minors. In Carey, how-
ever, the Court summarily rejected this asserted interest' 9 ' even
though, in Capital, it was the primary reason for the removal of
cigarette advertisements from the air.1 92 Although Carey did not
specifically address the problems of the broadcast media, its as-
sumption - that the protection of minors from the effects of con-
traceptive advertisements was not a compelling state interest -
certainly weakens the Capital rationale that protection of minors
justifies ba.ning certain advertising from the airwaves when such
advertising is deemed harmful to the nation's youth.'93
It seems clear, then, that so long as contraceptive advertise-
ments cannot be characterized as "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce
such action,"' 94 they should be constitutionally protected; there is
no apparent reason for the courts or the FCC to prohibit the ad-
vertising of contraceptives in the broadcast media. The FCC may
regulate only the noncommunicative aspects of advertisements to
make them conform to the generally accepted standards of broad-
cast media advertising. Thus, it should not use its power to pro-
hibit the advertisements because of their content.
IV. CONCLUSION
Commercial speech has developed from an unprotected form
of speech to one which is afforded some, although not full consti-
tutional protection. In framing advertising regulations, the state
may generally refer to the content of the message where there is a
rational basis for doing so; however, where the listeners' rights to
receive information are paramount, all views must be given a rea-
190. 431 U.S. at 690-91.
191. 431 U.S. at 701. The Court dismissed this reason as "classically" not a justifica-
tion for validating a regulation of speech.
192. See notes 136-46 supra and accompanying text.
193. In Capital, the district court said that the government's interest in protecting its
youth from the persuasiveness of broadcasting advertisements for cigarettes constituted a
rational basis for banning such advertisements from the airwaves. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
194. 431 U.S. at 701.
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sonable opportunity to be heard. When commercial speech is pro-
tected, it is because of its value to consumers.
Similarly, broadcasting has been subjected to regulations to
which the courts have applied less-than-strict scrutiny. Yet, as in
commercial speech, broadcasting may not be curtailed when the
broadcast adds to the information needed by the public to make
knowledgeable decisions.
Regulations prohibiting the broadcast of advertisements for
contraceptives which conform to the generally imposed standards
for other broadcast advertisements, should not survive a constitu-
tional challenge. The right of an individual to receive information
concerning -contraceptives regardless of his or her age has been
established, and the rationales previously used for validating re-
strictions on the broadcast media have been accordingly weak-
ened. Neither a compelling nor a reasonable state interest has
been articulated for justifying the prohibition of advertisements
for contraceptives from the broadcast media.
DORCAS A. Russo
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